












by Joris P.J.F. Scheepens
May 1993
ISSN 0924-7815ïK. u.~. ~
E„~~.ïOTNEEK




This paper considers a credit market where only the borrower directly observes the
outcome of a debt-financed investment project. Successful borrowers may falsely. claim
project failure and repudiate. Collateral and the option to file the borrower for bankruptcy
provide repayment incentives. Feasibility of a debt contract depends on the effectiveness
of these incentives. Given feasibility, the equilibrium debt contract is affected by the
bank's commitment to exercise the bankruptcy option, the quality of the court's
information and the penalty imposed on the borrower convicted for cheating. Collateral
increases with project risk. The bank's probability of filing the defaulting borrower for
bankruptcy depends on the successful entrepreneur's potential gain from cheating.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we study a credit mazket with asymmetric information in which
bankruptcy not always leads to liquidation of the debtor's assets, as in the usual
theoretical analysis of credit mazkets, but also allows for the possibility of reorgani7ation
of the firm in trouble. When the creditor cannot directly observe project outcomes, a
successful entrepreneur may falsely report failure of the investment project and repudiate.
Two instruments may provide a threat against cheating: collateral, and the bank's option
to file the borrower for bankruptcy. We study how the quality of the bankruptcy court's
information and the penalty imposed on the borrower, if convicted for cheadng about the
project outcome, influence the terms of the equilibrium debt contract (i.e. interest and
collateral).
Bankruptcy plays a vital role in cn~it markets. T'he essential aspect of the bartlvuptcy
mechanism is that it provides the possibility of a transfer of the debtor's assets to the
creditor(s) in case the debtor fails to fulfill his obligations, thus acting as a payment
incentive for the debtor. It usually involves deadweight cost. Gale and Hellwig (1985, p.
648) put it this way: "Bankruptcy is a costly business. But [..] without it contracts would
be even more constrained' and welfare would be even lower." Liquidation of the debtor's
assets is the basic bankruptcy procedure, which amounts to a sale of the firm or its assets.
Direct (administrative) and indirect liquidation costs (lost sales, human capital, reputation,
time, investment opportunities etc.) may add up to high percentages of remaining assets.
As an alternative to liquidation, a procedure of reorganization can usually be followed.
For instance in the United States firms filing for bankruptcy can be liquidated under
Chapter 7 of the US banlwptcy code or be reorganized under Chapter 11 of the code. In
the reorganization procedure the firm's creditors (including stockholders) retain the
enterprise and exchange their claims against the company for new (usually lower) claims
against the reorganized company. This may be especially valuable when the scrap value
of the firm is much less than its value as a going concern, or when there are no outside
buyers for the firm as a whole [see Bebchuk (1988)]. Reargani7ation may then
significantly reduce deadweight loss. If bank and borrower fail to voluntarily agree on
renegotiation of the loan, the bankruptcy court may in a later stage confirm a
reorganization plan anyway, as long as each dissenting class is treated "fairly andL
equitably" [see White ( 1989))2.
In the theory of credit markets, bankruptcy is usually modelled as liquidation of the
debtor's assets [see Hellwig (1977), Diamond ( 1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Hart and
Moore ( 1989), Bester ( 1990)]. The deadweight loss involved with liquidation may take
the form of a nonpecuniary penalty imposed on the borrower or some loss of value of the
assets. In this literature there is no ezplicit role for a third party in the agency
relationship, a"judge" responsible for implementing the bankruptcy procedure. One could
say that in these models the bankruptcy court has the same information as the bank, since
the liquidation decision is conditioned on an event that can be observed by the bank (non-
repayment of the debt). Our assumption about how the judge's information compares to
the principal's and the agent's differs from the usual assumption' in the credit market
literature. If the borrower is filed for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court is assumed to
have the competency to oblige the borrower to release some imperfect signal correlated
with the project outcome (e.g. it may hear some of the firm's personnel or scrutinize the
firm's books). The borrower cannot distort this signal. The distribution of information
among parties involved is assumed to be as follows:
- There is symmetric information ex ante about the characteristics of the investment
project.
- The borrower costlessly observes the project outcome.
- The bank only observes the project outcome after the borrower's assets are liquidated.
It dces not observe any signals correlated with the project return.
- If the borrower is filed for bankruptcy, the court sees some imperfect signal L of the
project return. It dces not observe the actual outcome of the project.
This information distribution allows us to model the process that starts after the borrower
has claimed default in a way that is compatible with actual bankruptcy laws.
We assume that both the outcome of the project and the entrepreneur's ability to repay
are independent of the terms of the loan agreement. If the project fails, the company is
unable to repay i[s debt and must report default. If it succeeds, the entrepreneur has two
oplions: either repay his debt, or cheat about the outcome of the project and report
dclault. In case of rcpayment, the borrower still yields positive profits. Shirking may be
profitable if there is a chance that the firm's assets will not be tiquidated subsequently, in
which case the successful entrepreneur eams an extra profit. The bank may honor a claim3
of default by offering debt renegotiation, amounting to partial debt forgiveness;
alternatively, the borrower is filed for bankruptcy. This means that the entrepreneur is
exposed to a legal procedure in which the bankruptcy court decides whether the firm will
be reorganized, or whether its assets will be liquidated.
The court aims at increasing social welfare by discouraging false claims of default by
successful entrepreneurs". If it finds a borrower guilty of cheating, the bormwer's
financial obligation is redeemed by a transfer of the project's remaining assets to the
bank. The bank will then liquidate the borrower's assets in order to maximize its return.
Moreover, the borrower may be punished by some nonpecuniary penalty. If the defendant
is acquitted of cheating, the firm will be reorganized. The reorganization procedure is
described below. The bankruptcy court's judgement is contingent on the outcome of a
costless but imperfect tesis, which is based on the imperfect signal L to be released on
request by the borrower.
Reorganization amounts to partial debt forgiveness. Given that default is reported
truthfully, bank and firm are best off if the firm pays the proceeds from the failed pmject
(which are less than the firm's debt) to the bank. Now if the court decides that the
borrower who claimed default is not cheating about the project outcome, bank and
borrower are to act as if the borrower justly reported default. Therefore the
reorganization procedure consists of the obiigation of the firm to pay the revenue of the
failed project to the bank, in exchange for forgiveness of the remaining part of the debt.
After the reorganization is finished, the entrepreneur will stay in control and continue his
activitiesb. This procedure, with deadweight cost much lower than in case of liquidation,
is righteous for the unsuccessful borrower. The successful borrower who is wrongly
acquitted, however, yields an extra profit. Thus, the successful borrower's incentive to
falsely claim default is negatively correlated with the preciseness of the court's decision.
Starting point of this paper is the credit market literature; the aim is to provide some
insight into the role that actual bankruptcy procedures play for credit markets and debt
contracts. Actual bankruptcy procedures are taken as given, and modelleri in a simplified
and stylized way. The choice of a setting of just one creditor helps us evade many of the
difficult problems of conflicts among creditors that are dealt with in bankruptcy law and
the law-oriented literature, in order not to unnecessarily complicate matters.
We will concentrate on the following questions: What is the influence of the4
preciseness of the court's decision on the contents of the optimal contract, and on both
bank's and borrower's equilibrium actions? What are the implications of imposing a
nonpecuniary punishment on a borrower that is found guilty of cheating? How does the
equilibrium amount of collateral depend on the risk of project failure, given the presence
of the bankruptcy court? In section 2 we set out the basic model. We distinguish between
the case of precommitment against renegotiation of the initial contract (section 3) and the
renegotiation case in section 4. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2. The model
Assume that a risk-neutral entrepreneur plans to undertake a profitable project that
requires an initial investment of fixed size I. The project has two possible outcomes: with
probability q the project will be successful, yielding positive return X5i and with
complementary probability it will fail, yielding positive return XF c I c XS. The
parameters of the firm's investment project are public knowledge. The entrepreneur has
no liquid funds available to finance the investment; he needs to raise the amount I from
an outside financier.
The realization of the firm's project is observed costlessly by the entrepreneur; the
financier can only observe the project return after liquidation of the debtor's assets. Since
the original entrepreneur is assumed to be a better manager of the project than outsiders,
liquidation of the firm's assets is costly. The financier values the project's revenue X as
~X, with 0 ~~ ~ 1, thus losing an amount (1-a)X. Gale and Hellwig (1985) have
shown that in this situation of asymmetric information about the project's return
realization a standard debt contract is optimaL Therefore, the outside financial
participation I takes the form of a bank loan.
The debt contract, denoted by D, specifies a fixed repayment obligation R 1 I and
some amount of collateral C to be posted by the borrower. The borrower is assumed to
possess a certain amount of private wealth, W, that cannot be used to finance the project,
say because it is illiquid. This wealth may (partly) be posted as coilateral to secure the
bank loan, so 0 s C 5 W. The collateral is confiscated by the bank whenever the
borrower defaults on the loan. The transfer of collateral involves deadweight cost (1-B)C,5
with 0 c B G l, so the bank values the collateral as BC. To enforce debt repayment the
contract specifies that the bank may file the borrower for bankruptcy if the borrower fails
to pay his debt.
If a borrower is filed for bankruptcy, the court tests the null hypothesis Ho: the
defendant is not guilty of cheating, against the alternative hypothesis H~: the defendant is
guilty, using a costless but imperfect test. The following table describes the test's stylized
form, by denoting the probabilities that the borrower's project is assigned to one of the
categories S(success) and F (failure), given that it is of type s(success) and f (failure).
Test result
S F
~ s r 1-r
f 1-r r
We assume 'fz G r c 1. The test parameter is public knowledge.
The supply of loanable funds is unlimited at some exogenously given deposit rate', say
zero, so that the initial investment I equals the end-of-period repayment obligation of the
bank to its depositors. Both bank and borrower are assumed to be risk-neutral.
The following game will be adopted to analyze borrower and lender behavior. In the
competition stage of the game, banks compete by offering debt contracts D-(R,C). The
firm may find none of the contracts acceptable in which case the game ends and all
parties get zero payoff. Alternatively, the entrepreneur's individual rationality constraint
is satisfied and the entrepreneur accepts the most favorable offer. By competition, this
offer generates zero expected profits to the chosen bank. This bank then transfers an
amount of funds I from its depositors to the firm, and the wmpany undertakes the
investment of size I. The banks whose offers have been turned down receive zero payoff.
Subsequently, the following renegotiation game is played:
1. The project return is observed by the entrepreneur only.
2. The unsuccessful entrepreneur is by assumption unable to repay his debt R, as R 1 I
~ X,:, and is forced to report default. The successful entrepreneur has two options: he
can either make his debt payment R c XS, or can falsely claim default. He adopts a6
possibly mixed strategy with probability d of pretending project failure, 0 5 d 5 1,
and so he repays his debt R with probability ( 1-d). In case of repayment, the game
ends. The entrepreneur earns a profit of XS - R; the bank receives a positive payoff of
R- I. If default is reported (either by the unsuccessful entrepreneur or by the cheating
successful entrepreneur), the bank will take over the collateral posted by the
entrepreneur and the game reaches its next stage:
3. The bank can choose either to file the defaulter for bankruptcy, or to offer a new
contract in which the entrepreneur's debt is reduced to the maximum amount that the
unsuccessful borrower could repay XF. The bank also adopts a possibly mixed strategy,
with probability f, 0 ~ f 5 1, of offeríng debt forgiveness. In case of debt
forgiveness, the bank earns XF f 13C - I; the borrower receives Xg - XF - C if he was
successful and - C else; the game ends.
4. Alternatively, if the borrower is filed for bankruptcy, in court an imperfect test will be
performed to determine whether or not the borrower is really unable to make his debt
payments. With probabili[y I' the court takes the right decision. If the firm is acquitted
of cheating it will be reorganized, which is in both bank's and borrower's interests if
the court is right; payoffs are the same as in the case of volun[ary debt forgiveness by
the bank. If the court decides that the borrower is guilty of cheating, i.e. that he is
able to meet his obligations and falsely reported defauit, the bank will take over the
project in addition to the borrower's collateral and liquidate it; moreover, the borrower
will be punished by a nonpecuniary amount P? 0. There is no room for ex post
renegotiation of the court's decision. If filed for bankruptcy, the successful firm's
expected profit is -I'(PfC) f(1-I')(X;XFC); the unsuccessful firm earns
-(1 1')(PfC) - PC."
The players' payoff's depend on the debt contract D-(R,C), the exogenous "court
parameters" P and P, and the equilibrium actions (d,f). Denote' the entrepreneur's
expected payoff by U(R,C,P,P,d,f), and the bank's expected profit by V(R,C,P,P,d,~.
Any given debt contract D-(R,C) induces a subgame perfect equilibrium (d,f) in
stages 1- 4 of the renegiotiation game. A contract D-(R,C) is said to be feasible if
there is an equilibrium (d,f) such that U(R,C,I',P,d,f) ? 0 and V(R,C,I',P,d,f) ? 0.7
'Che following assumptions are always maintained:
I 1 X,: t W (1)
aX, ~ X,. (2)
qXy f (I-q)X,: 1 I (3)
q[PaXs ~- (1-P)X~:] -f (I-q)[(1-P)a -f- P]X,. t I3W C [ (4)
Assumption (1) rules out the motive for collaterization in Barro ( 1976) and Benjamin
(1978), where the borrower repays only if the value of the collateral ezceeds his debt. As
R 1 I, it implies that the successful borrower would prefer to default if default would
have no further consequences, thus pointing at the need for a bankruptcy procedure. Also
it implies that default is a risk for the bank: the bank cannot recover the loan's face value
I if the project fails. Assumption (2) states that the expected revenue to the creditor from
liquidation of the assets of a successful borrower exceeds the gain from renegotiation. If
this inequality would not hold, then the bank would never file any borrowers for
bankruptcy, because it could only lose by doing so. Assumption (3) implies that the firm
can operate profitably. If it were no[ satisfied, it would never be profi[able for the
cnlrepreneur to execute the investment project as the project's ezpected revcnue would
not exceed the initial investment. Assumption (4) refers to the situation in which the
successful borrower would choose always to report default (d - I). The bank would
respond to this by never offering debt forgiveness (f - 0). In this situation the bank is
assumed to earn negative expected profits irrespective of the amount of collateral C s
W. As a consequence of (4), the bank will offer a contract such that i[ is never optimal
for the entrepreneur to choose d- 1.
If we study the game that starts after the project return has been observed by the
entrepreneur only, the bank's decision variable is f, the probability of offering debt
forgiveness. The (successful) entrepreneur's decision variable is d, the probability of
claiming default after the best outcome of the project XS is observed.
3. Commitment against renegotiation
In this section, we consider the game described above under the condition that the
bank is committed not to offer debt forgiveness. The probability of offering debt8
forgiveness f is exogenousiy put equal to zero. We investigate how the accuracy of the
court's test r and the nonpecuniary punishment P influence the equilíbrium debt
contract D-(R,G) .
Proposition 1: There exist r, Í' with tsP such that the equilibrium in case of
precommitment against renegotiation (f ~ 0) has the following features:
(a) !f r~r , there is no feasible contract.
(b) 1f ~r . afeasible deót contract D is signed such that V(12,C,I',P,a,f~0) -0 .
The equilibrium in the renegotiation subgame satisfies d-0 . The optimal
amount ofcollutera! C is characterizedasfollows:
(i) If r~l' , then the equilibrium amount of co[lateral C is positive and strictly
decreasing in r and in P.
(ii) If r~Í' , then the optimal amoum of collateral is zero: C-0 .
The quality of the court's information, reflected by r, influences the equilibrium debt
contract in an unambiguous way. Proposition 1 shows that if the court's information falls
below some minimum quality standard, then the market for corporate debt may collapse.
The reason is the adverse effect of the court on the borrower's incentive to repay his debt
in case the project succeeds. If the court's information is sufficiently precise, however,
then in equilibrium precommitment against renegotiation induces the successful borrower
never to claim project failure. The higher the court's accuracy, the lower the amount of
collateral required to withhold the successful borrower from repudiating.
The penalty P for cheating plays a dual role with regard to its effect on the equilibrium
outcome of the model. On one hand, higher P increases the borrower's fear to be9
convicted and lowers the amount of collateral needed in equilibrium, so there is a trade-
off between collateral and punishment. On the other hand, P is a pure deadweight cost. If
it is high, then the borrower's individual rationality constraint becomes binding or may
even be violated. In the latter case no feasible contract exists. If the borrower's individual
rationality constraint is binding, a rise in P reduces the area in which lending is feasible.
In proposition 1, this dual role of P appears from the effect of P on the critical values
t and Í' for I' and on ~. The upper critical value I' is decreasing in P, so for
higher P the region in which C equals zero is larger. To clarify how the lower critical
value t depends on P, consider the borrower's individual rationality and wealth
constraints. The borrower's individual rationality constraint is satisfied only if the
equilibrium amount of collateral dces not exceed some upper bound C, which is
decreasing in P'o. Clearly, the wealth and individual rationality constraints will not be
binding at the same time. Now if the bormwer's individual rationality constraint is not
binding and the wealth constraint is, then t is decreasing in P, so in this case higher P
increases the region in which lending is feasible. However, as P gets too high, the
borrower's individual rationality constraint will be binding ( C~W ). Then t is
increasing in P, so the range in which lending is feasible starts to narrow. This illustrates
P's dual role. Because of these two effects one could determine some welfare-maximizing
value P' for P. P' would be dependent on the parameters of the model, of which the
project's succes probability q is one. In order to attain P' the judge would have to
discriminatc among borrowers. Entrcprcneurs with diffcrent success probabilities would
face different penalties if convicted for cheating. This type of "class justice" of course
violates a basic principle of justice. P' would be far from optimal according to other than
strictly economic standards. Therefore we are not concemed with determining P' and
assume P to be exogenous.10
The equilibrium interest rate is not directly affected by the nonpecuniary penalty P,
because the bank dces not directly benefit from a conviction. Only through the
equilibrium amount of collateral, P may have an indirect effect on R. Higher P may
reduce the required level of collateral. Lower collateral pushes up the equilibrium interest
rate at which the bank earns zero profit. Therefore, ceteris paribus a higher nonpecuniary
penalty may result in a higher equilibrium interest rate. Higher quality of the court's
administration ofjustice (higher I~ leads to a lower equilibrium interest rate.
The wealthy entrepreneur may get a loan in situations in which he would not be
financed if he were poorer, since the range for I' in which a feasible contract exists is
larger if the borrower can bring in more wealth as collateral. This can be seen from
proposition 1 by the fact that the lower bound P may be" decreasing in W. Conversely,
borrowers may be denied credit if they face a binding constraint on the amount of
collateral they can provide. In different contexts Bester (1987) and Besanko and Thakor
(1987) derive a similar result.
PrQposition 2: Assume that the creditor is precommitted not to offer debt forgiveness.
If 1,~P~Í' , then the equilibritun amount of collateral is strictly decreasing in the
prnject's success probahiliry q.
The intuition for this result is that for higher risk of project failure, i.e. lower q,
repudiation becomes more attractive. Given that default is reported, the (ex post)
probability that the project actually has failed is the higher the lower q is. This increases
the incentive for the successful firm to shirk. Given I' and P, this incentive may be
counterbalanced by higher collateral requirements to induce truthtelling behavior.
Thus, our model provides a theoretical explanation for the soning-by-observed-risk
paradigm [see Berger and Udell (1990)], referring to the situation that observably risky
borrowers (i.e. borrowers with a relatively low probability to succceà) may be required to
pledge collateral, while observably safe borrowers need not do so. Bester (1990) presents
a model in which it is optimal for the borrower to bring in his total wealth as collateral if
the risk of project failure is above some critical value; if the risk is less than the critical11
value, zero collateral is optimal. This positive relation between the risk of project failure
and the equilibrium amount of collateral is found only if renegotiation of the initial debt
contract is possible. Our model extends Bester's result in two ways. Firstly, in our model
also11 in a si[uation without renegotiation there is a positive relationship between risk
and collateral. This phenomenon occurs because in our model even without voluntary
contract renegotiation there is still a chance that debt will be forgiven in the
reorganization procedure of bankruptcy. In order to keep the successful firm from
speculating on debt forgiveness in case of reorganization (because of inaccuracy of the
court's decision), collateral may be needed to make voluntary default unattractive.
Secondly, in our model the amount of collateral required depends continuously on the risk
of project failure. The model explains not only why a certain type of borrower pledges
collateral and another type dces not; it also shows that the optimal amount of collateral
can take any value in the closed interval [O,W], depending on the succes probability q.
Contrary to the sorting-by-observed-risk paradigm, most theoretical studies consider
the situation where banks are totally uninformed about borrower risks. Besanko and
Thakor (1987), Bester (1985, 1987) and Chan and Kanatas (1985) show that low-risk
entrepreneurs can then reveal themselves by accepting relatively high collateral
requirements, that would be unattractive for firms with relatively high probabilities of
default. As outside collateral may serve as an incentive or screening device, these studies
predict that lower-risk borcowers pledge more collateral than higher-risk borrowers. This
can be referred to as the sur~ing-by-privu~e-informution paradigm. In the banking
community, conventional wisdom tends to favor the sorting-by-observed-risk paradigm to
the sorting-by-private-information paradigm". Berger and Udell (1990) and Lceth and
Scott (1989) present empirical evidence that supports this view.
4. Absence of precommitment against renegotiation
In the previous section we assumed that the bank was committed not to offer debt
forgiveness. In this section, the bank considers filing [he borrower for bankruptcy to be
an option rather than a necessity after default is reported, i.e. f will be endogenized. First12
we shall analyze whether the outcome (j,aj -(0,0) of the past section can be part of an
equilibrium path, and whether other pure strategy equilibria exist.
P~r position 3: Assume that rhere is no commitment against renegotiation of the initial debt
contract. Suppose a feasible contract D has óeen signed. Then (f,d) -(0,0) is a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium of the renegotiation game only if the bankruptcy procedure
imposes no deadweight loss, i.e. only if either a- 1 or I` - 1. ]f a C 1 or I' c 1,
there is no pure-strategy equilfbrium ofthe renegotiation game.
In section 2, we restricted a and I' to be strictly smaller than 1. Under this assumption
no pure-strategy equilibra exist, so we shall only look for mixed-strategy equilibria. As
seen in the previous section, in case of precommitment against renegotiation the
borrower's repayment behavior reveals his private information about the project outcome:
only the unsuccessful borrowers report default. If renegotiation is possible, this no longer
holds; in a mixed-strategy equilibrium, the bank cannot deduct the project outcome with
certainty from the borrower's repayment behavior. After observing default, the bank
updates its beliefs about the outcome of the investment project; its posterior probability
G(d) that the project has been successful is given by Bayes' rule: G(d) - qdl(qdtl-q). In
equilibrium the successful debtor picks the probability to repudiate d' such that after
default is reported, the bank is exactly indifferent between offering debt forgiveness or
filing the borrower for bankruptcy. Given this value d', in equilibrium the bank chooses
the probability of offering debt forgiveness f such that the successful borrower is
indifferent between repayment and repudiation.
Proposition 4: Assume rhat rhere is no commitment against renegotiation of the initial debt
contract. Given that afeasible debt contract D- (R,C) is signed, the unique equilibrium




Of course, existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium requires that both f and d' are in
the range (0,1). In the proof of Proposition 5 rt will be shown that feasibility of a debt
contract" automatically implies 0 c d' c 1 and 0 c f c 1.
Given U, the way in which according to Proposition 4 the accuracy of the court's
decision inFluences the equilibrium of the renegotiation game is in accordance with
intuition. The equilibrium probability of the successful borrower to report default d' is
decreasing in I', because a higher probability to be caught cheating lowers the successful
borrower's incentive to cheat about the project outcome. T'he bank will respond to this by
offering debt forgiveness with relatively high probability, whích explains why the equi-
librium probability f to offer debt forgiveness is increasing in I`.
According to Proposition 4 higher collateral increases the probability of debt forgive-
ness f. So higher C reduces the probability of deadweight loss from liquidation. As can
be seen from the specification of f, this effect of C will be more favorable for lower I'.
This stems from the fact that lower I' makes d' go up and also the probability (qd'f i-q)
that the collateral C is transferred. Thus, the impact of a given amount of collateral on
the successful borrower's incentive to repay is higher for lower I'. On the other hand the
use of C creates additional deadweight loss because the borrower's valuation of the
collateral exceeds the lender's valuation by a fraction (1-B). Which of the two effects
dominates the other depends on the probability that the court decides to liquidate, as well
as on the nonpecuniary penalty P and on the relative costs a and (3. Lemma 3 in the
Appendix shows that there is a unique critical value I`' for I' such that a higher amount of
collateral increases total welfare for I' c P', and a higher amount of collateral decreases
total welfare for I' ~ I". The amount of collateral specified in the optimal loan contract
will therefore be the result of a minimization problem if I' 1 I", and [he result of a
maximization problem elsewhere. Proposition 5 reFlects these considerations.
Proposition 5: There exist ~~, Í'i with L~sÍ`i , P' c 1 and I'" c 1 such that the
equilibrium in the absence ofprecommitment has the following features:
(u) If I`~L~ , there is nofeasible contract.14
(b) If L~~I'~I" , a feasible debt contract D' is signed only if I' c I'' and if the
óorrower's wealth W is su„~`' iciently large. D' is such that V(R',C',I',P,df) - 0.
The equilibrium in the renegotiation subgame is given by 0 c f c I and 0 c d'
c 1. The optimal amount ofcollateral equals C- W.
(c) If I'~Max[),~;I"] , a debt contract D' is signed such that V(R', C', I',P,d'fJ- 0.
The equilibrium in the renegotiation subgame is given by 0 c f c 1 and
0 c d' c 1. The optimal amount of collateral C' is characterized asfollows:
(i) If r c r', then C' - w.
(ii) If I' ~ P' and I`~Í`i , then C' is positive, strictly decreasing in P and
independent of P.
(iii) If P 1 P' and I'~Í'i , rhen C' - 0.
Analogous to the commmitment case, also in case of renegotiation low-quality
information of the court may lead to collapse of the mazket for corporate debt, while
sufficiently precise information allows a feasible con[ract to be signed. In proposition 5(c)
the influence of I' on the equilibrium debt contract is straightforward: higher quality of
the court's information leads to (equal or) lower collateral in equilibrium. The role of I'
in proposi[ion 5(a) and (c) is a bit more subtle than in the precommitment case
(proposition 1(a) and (b)) because of the occurrance of the critical value I". In case of
precommitment against renegotiation, higher collateral always leads to higher deadweight
loss involved with collateral. In case of renegotiation, this is only the case for I' ~ I" as
we discussed above. If I' c I", higher collateral results in lower deadweight loss, so
collateral is maximized. We point out that this is possible only in case of renegotiation
because the bank responds to the borrower's improved incentive to repay (due to higher
collateral) by lowering the probability of filing the defaulter for bankruptcy; in case of
precommitment against renegotiation the bank cannot respond in this way.
The critical value I'" plays a crucial role in the somewhat counterintuitive situation thatis described in part (b) of the proposition's. If ~~Z c I' c I'", the entrepreneur's
expected payoff is negative in case no collateral is pledged. In this case nonnegative
expected profit can be attained by the borrower only if his profit increases with collateral
(I' c I"). The advantageous effect of high collateral on the successful borrower's
incentive to repay allows a relatively high equilibrium probability of debt forgiveness in
case default is reported. If the probability of debt forgiveness is high enough to outweigh
the deadweight cost of high collateral, lending is feasible (i.e. I`~L~ ) even if P c I'".
In case of precommitment there is a tradeoff between collateral and the penalty P. In
case of renegotiation P dces not directly affect the equilibrium amount of collateral, but
higher P pushes up the equilibrium probability of voluntary debt forgiveness f. This
reflects the bank's reaction to the effect of the penalty on the borrower's incentive to
repay. T'hrough this channel higher P may increase welfare, in spite of the fact that it
involves pure deadweight loss. Although we are not concerned with optimizing the court's
actions, it is clear that for a satisfactory functioning of the market for corporate debt, the
penalty for cheating about the project outcome should reflect a compromise between the
two contrary effects that aze pursued: the effect on the successful borrower's incentive
versus the aim to avoid unnecessary deadweight loss.
The borrower's wealth influences his ability to get a loan in two ways. Since L'~ is
decreasing in W, the range for I' in which a feasible contract exists is larger if the
borrower can put up more wealth as collateral. Moreover, proposition 5(b) describes a
region for I' in which the borrower's wealth must be sufficiently large in order for
lending to be feasible.
Progosition 6: Assume tha there is rto commitrnent against renegotiation of the initial debt
contract. !f Max(~,I`"]~I`~Í'~ , the equilibrium amount of collateral is decreasing in the
prnject's success prnbabilitv q.
Analogous to proposition 2, also in case of renegotiation our model provides a16
theoretical explanation for the sorting-by-observed-risk paradigm.
What effect dces a"tough" position of the bank with regazd to its treatment of
defaul[ers (precommitment against renegotiation) have on the equilibrium amount of
collateral, compared to a"weaker" position of no precommitment? And how do such
positions affect feasibility of a debt contract? Tfiese questions are answered in proposition
7(a) and 7(b), respectively.
Proposition 7:
(a) !f lending isfeasible in case of commitment and in case of renegotiation, then the
equilibrium amount of collateral required is either smaller in case ojcommitment
than in case ofrenegotiation, orequal to zero in both cases.
(b) (i) !f P is not too large then if lending isfeasible in case of renegotiation, it is also
feasible in case of commitment.
(ii) For large P lending rnay be feasible in case of renegotiation, while in case of
commitment against renegotiation it is not.
The intuition for proposition 7(a) is the following. The "tougher" position of the bank
in case of precommitment against renegotiation reduces the successful borrower's
incentive to cheat compazed to the situation of renegotiation. As a result, in case of
commitment a lower amount of collateral suffices in equilibrium. Figure 1 illustrates this
by drawing the equilibrium amount of collateral (given that the initial investment I equals
l) as a function of P. The thin line represents the wealth constraint C 5 W. All
parameters are chosen such that the assumptions ( I)-(4) aze satisfied. The boid line
represents the equilibrium amount of collateral in case of precommitment, and the broken
line represents the equilibrium amount of collateral in case of renegotiation.
[insert Figure 1]
Given 7(a), it seems logical that if borrowing is feasible with renegotiation, it is also
feasible with commitment because the borrower puts up less collateral in the latter case.
The interesting thing about 7(b) is that this need not hold in general. Of course, the
absence of precommitment decreases the borrower's incentive not to cheat; this has a
welfare-lowering effect. However, for lazge P this negative effect may be outweighed by
the decrease in deadweight cost due to dropping precommitment. In case of renegotiationFigure 1. Equilibrium amount of collateral












gammathe probability that the borrower who defaults is filed for bankruptcy is lower by a
fraction f c 1 compared to the situation of precommitment, and also the probability that
he is punished by P. The expected penalty may become sufficiently low so that borrowing
is again profitable. Proposition 7(b.ii) is illustrated in Figure 2. Again the thin line
represents the wealth constraint, the bold line represents collateral if renegotiation is
impossible and the broken line represents collateral in case of renegotiation. The penalty
P is twice as high as in Figure 1; all other parameters are the same. In the area where 'fi
~ r ~ r, lending is infeasible in case of precommitment, while in case of renegotiation
it is feasible with C' - W.
[insert Figure 2]
Thus, the welfare effect of precommitment is not necessarily positive. If the social cost of
the bankruptcy procedure is high relative to the court's accuracy, then precommitment
may actually lower welfare.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper has examined the influence of the bankruptcy option on the borrower's
incentives and on the equilibrium debt contract. Since only the borrower directly observes
the investment's return, the successful borrower may falsely claim project failure and
repudiate. The court aims at discouraging this type of improductive behavior. It
contributes to welfare if its accuracy is high enough to compensate for its social cost. If
its operation is relatively inefficient, debt renegotiation may increase welfare compared to
precommitment against renegotiation because renegotiation prevents court involvement.
The model also provides a theoretical explanation for the empirically relevant situation
that observably risky borrowers pledge more collateral than observably safe borrowers.
In this paper the bankruptcy procedure takes a simple and stylized form. Several
extensions can be made. However, if the penalty imposed on the borrower who is
convicted for chea[ing would be endogenized, the optimal penalty P' would depend on [he
success probability of the borrower's project. Entrepreneurs with different abilities would
be penalized differently in case of conviction. This type of discrimination among
borrowers violates a basic principle of justice. Therefore a penalty that is optimal to
strictly economic standards may be far from optimal according to e.g. legal standards.Figure 2. Equilibrium amount of collateral















A more general testing technology could enable the accuracy of the court's test to vary
with its cost. The court would be concerned with the optimal effort to be put into
gathering information on the case. Again the court should not discriminate among
borrowers. Alternatively the borrower could be allowed to be able to influence the
outcome of the test. If the borrower after being filed for bankruptcy can either hire either
a good but expensive lawyer or a bad lawyer at zero cost, in our model only the
successful borrower who falsely claimed default has funds available fmm the project to
hire a good lawyer. Given that the court cannot observe the funds spent on legal advice
by the borrower, the cheating borrower's higher ability of influencing the court's decision
could lower the effectiveness of the bankruptcy procedure. T'his would make a debt
renegotiation offer by the bank more likely. Since the borrower would anticipate the
higher probability of debt forgiveness, his increased incentive to repudiate if successful
might be counterbalanced by higher collateral requirements.
Appendix 1. Precommitment against renegotiation
Before stating the proofs of propositions 1 and 2, we discuss some constraints to the
problem that bank and borrower face, and give some definitions.
Given the equilibrium of the renegotiation subgame (determined in Proposition 1) and
the amount of collateral C, the equilibrium interest rate is such that the bank earns zero









Combine the borrower's wealth constraint C 5 W with (A2) to obtain19
(A3)
CsM-Min[C,WJ
Of course, a necessary condition for lending to be feasible for the borrower is Cz0 .





Two critical values for r, used in Proposition 1, are defined as:
(AS) r- Max~~,rM] and Í' ~ Max[Í`e,I'y] ,
where rM is as in (A4) and the other two expressions are given by:
L - I-X~1-(1-q)(1-a)]-~a'q(1-a)] P - I-Xt.[1-(1-q)(1-a)]
A q(Xy.-XFtP)t(I-q)(1-a)Xf " - 9(XS-XFtP).(1-q)(1-a)XF
Proof of Protwsition 1: First we show that if a contract D is feasible, one must
have d-0. Assume that a feasible contract exists. By assumption (4), the bank's
individual rationality constraint is satisfied only if it offers a contract such that the
successful borrower picks a~l. The successful borrower will find repayment at least as
favorable as shirking if
(A6) XS - R?(1-r)[XS - XF - C] - r(C t P)
If the inequality is strict, the successful entrepreneur repays and d-0. Suppose that the
equality holds, so that the successful borrower is indifferent between repayment and
cheating. In this situation, suppose that the entrepreneur would not choose d - 0. Then
the bank could increase its profit by slightly lowering R, thereby inducing the borrower to
sclect d- 0. Therefore a-0 . Next the optimization problem to which D-(R,G) is the
solution is characterized. The optimal contract maximizes the entrepreneur's payoff
subject to zero profit for the bank, nonnegative profit for the entrepreneur (individual20
rationality) and the entrepreneur's wealth constraint. With regard to the objective
function, note that since C involves deadweight cost, the en[repreneur's payoff is
maximized if C is minimized. If (A6) holds, R ensures that the zero bank profit
condition is satisfied. The borrower's individual rationality constraint requires
U(D,I',P,d-0,f-0) z 0, i.e. q(XS - R) -(1-til{(I-I')(P-F-C) f I'C} ~ 0. By subs6tuting
the equilibrium interest rate we obtain the upper bound (A2) on C. Combining this with
the borrower's wealth constraint yields constraint (A3). A necessary condition for lending
to be feasible is M? 0, and since W~ 0 this holds iff C20 , or equivalently iff
constraint (A4) is satisfied. Thus, the optimal contract picks R from (AI) and minimizes
C subject to the conditions 0 5 C 5 M and (Atí). The latter condition can be restated in





Since C is minimized, if lending is feasible in equilibrium C equals
C' - Max [0 ;~]. It can be checked easily that ~x0 i,~` I'sÍ'a and ~sM i,,d`' I'ztA .
To prove part (a) of the proposition, note that the condition I' ~ I' incorporates
conditions (A3) and (A4). Condition (A4) is necessary and sufficient for M nonnegative,
which is necessary for C in [O,M], as we discussed above. If (A4) holds, i.e. given M
nonnegative, the condition I'~r~ is necessary and sufficient for feasibility because it
ensures that the equilibrium amount of collateral Max[0, ~] 5 M(condition A3).
Therefore I'~t-Max[),~,I'M] is necessary and sufficient for feasible lending by the bank.zt
(b.i) is proven by noting that if I'~r in equilibrium a-0 . If collateral is positive, (A6)
is binding or equivalently C'-~ . Collateral is positive for O~~sM , which is satisfied
for rASI`~PB . Combining this with constraint (A4) proves that C'-~ for r~P~Í' .
(b.ii) is proven by noting that if IyÍ' ,(A6) holds for C- 0 because C c 0 if I'~Í'e .
Necessary for the borrower's individual rationality constraint (A2) to be satisfied is that
(A4) holds; this is the case by definition of Í' . Q.E.D.
Proof of ProRosition 2: Proposition 1 states that for r~I`~Í' , C'-~ , which is strictly
decreasing in q. Q.E.D.
Appendix 2. No precommitment against renegotiation
After the proofs of propositions 3 and 4, we define the expressions that appear in
proposition 5 and state some lemma's. The proof of proposition 5 concludes the
Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 3: First we consider the uniqueness problem. The four candidates for
a pure-strategy equilibrium are (f,d) -(0,0), (1,1), (0,1), (1,0). Note that by assumpdon
(4) d- 1 will never be part of an equilibrium path. Also f- 1 cannot yield an
equilibrium, because by R~ I and (1) the successful entrepreneur will optimally choose
d- 1 in response to f- I; but given that the successful entrepreneur always claims
default, the bank will want to provide an incentive against cheating by lowering f. So the
only remaining candidate for a pure-strategy equilibrium is (f,d) -(0,0). This proves
uniqueness. We continue by showing that this is a subgame perfect equilibrium only if a
- 1 or I' - 1. In proposition 1 it was already shown that d- 0 is the best response to f
- 0. Dropping proposition 1's restriction f- 0, given that the successful entrepreneurzz
will never cheat (d - 0), the bank has an incentive to raise f to 1 unless the bankruptcy
procedure in court involves no deadweight cost. Therefore f- 0 can only be the optimal
response to d- 0 if a- 0 andlor I' - 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of ProQosition 4: We derive the equilibrium of the renegotiation game, given that a
feasible contract has been signed. When the debtor reports default, from Bayes' rule the
creditor calculates the following ex post probability that XS has been realized: G(d) -
qdl(qdt 1-c~. The optimal value d' follows directly from the condition that in equilibrium
the bank will be indifferent between forgiving or bringing the defaulter to court:
(A~ XF~-BC - G(d)[I'(aXs-~BC) -F (1-I')(XPfBC)]
f (1-G(dp[(1-1~(aXPf-BC)tI'(XPfBC)]
The optimal value ffollows directly from the condition that the successful entrepreneur
must in equilibrium be indifferent between either reporting default or paying his debt R:
(A8) f(XSXPC) f(1-f){I'(-P-C) f(1-I')(Xg X,~C)} - Xs - R. Q.E.D.
Next we discuss some constraints to the problem that bank and borrower face, and give
definitions. Given the equilibrium of the renegotiation subgame (d',t) and the amount of
collateral C, in equilibrium the bank earns zero ezpected profit: V(R',C,P,P,d',f)- 0.
Therefore
(A9) R ,- I-(qd 't1-q)(Xp{ ~~
q(1-d')
Using (A8) and substituting R', d' and P into U(R,C,1',P,d,f) we can prove1ó
mm 1. Given the equilibrium interest rate R' and the equilibrium of the renegotiation
subgame (d'f), the entrepreneur's expected payo„~`' U(R', C,I',P,d'f)- B- A. C, where
A - (qd'tl-q)(1-a)-d' - [q(1-d')}(qd'tl-q)~l(1-qxl-1~P
1-d' (1-d'MI`(XS-XF4~




From Lemma 1 it follows that the entrepreneur's individual rationality constraint
B- A.C ? 0, denoted in terms of C, can take four different forms:23
l. If A~ 0 and B ~ 0, B- A.C is nonnegative iff CsC~sB~A .
2. If A ~ 0 and B ~ 0, B- A.C is nonnegative for all C z 0.
3. If A 1 0 and B c 0, B- A.C is not nonnegative for any C z 0.
4. If A C 0 and B G 0, B- A.C is nonnegative iff CZC'gB~A ,
Define MR as follows:
MR-Min[ C~ ,W]ifA ~O,B~O.
Ma ~ W either if A c 0, B~ 0
or if A c 0, B c 0 and W 1 BIA.
MR ~- oo either if if A~ 0, B ~ 0
or if A G 0, B c 0 and W c BIA.
Then the entrepreneur's individual rationality constraint B- A.C z 0 and wealth
constraint C 5 W are satisfied iffl': '
(A 10) C L MR









Two more critical values for I' that appear in Proposition 5 are identified in Lemma's 2
and 3.
Lemma 2: Given the equilibrium ofthe renegotiation subgame and the equilibrium interest
rate R', there is a unique critical value I" c 1 for I' such that B 1 0 iff I' ~ I`", i.e.
such that the entrepreneur's payo,~`'in case no collateral is posted B is positive iff
P~ P". Ib is increasing in P.
Proof: Define E - q(aXs-XF)-(qXS}(1-q)XF I) ; F- 9(1-q)(1-o~)XF(Xs-XF) ; and24
G-(1-c~(I-XF)(a7{S-XF). Note that E,F,G ~ 0 by (3), XS1XF and (2) respectively.
Multiplicating B by qr(1-d~(XSXFfP)(aXsXF), substituting d' and rearranging, B~ 0




It is verified easily that ro is increasing in P. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3: Given rhe equilibrium ofthe renegotiation subgame and rhe equilibrium interest
rate R', there is a unique critical value r' c 1 for r such that A~ 0 iff r ~ I'', i.e.
such that a higher amount of collateral increases total welfare for r c r', anda higher
amount ofcollateral decreases total welfare if r ~ r'. r' is increasing in P.
Proof: If r- 1, A~ 0, so the critical value r' (as defined in the lemma) c 1. After
some tedious calculations it can be shown that the first derivative of A with respect to r
is positive, so A is strictly increasing in r. Therefore there is a unique r' c 1 such that
A 1 0 iff r~ r'. To show that r' is increasing in P, note that from lemma 1 it is easy
to check that the first derivative of A with respect to P is negative. Therefore for large P
we need a relatively high r to have A~ 0, so r'is increasing in P. Q.E.D.
The following lemma gives an intermediate result used in the proof of Proposition 5.




mm 4~ The optimal contract D' solves the following maximization problem:
Max~ B- A. C s. t.
(A10J C 5 MR
(A 14J C z MaxJO,~ ~~ J
Moreover, the solution to this problem implies 0 c d c 1 and0 c f c 1.
Proof: Since the bank earns zero profit, the optimal contract maximizes the entrepreneur's
payoff B - A.C. This expression is deducted in lemma 1 under the assumption that a
feasible equilibrium of the renegotiation subgame exists. Assumption (A10) is necessary
and sufficient for borrowing to be feasible for the entrepreneur, as discussed above. Next25
we show that lending is feasible for the bank (i.e. zero profit is attainable) if and only if
assumption (A14) holds. The proof ends by showing that (A14) implies 0 c d' c 1 and
0 ~ t" c l. By assumption (4), if d- 1 lending is not feasible. Therefore d must be
small enough in order to make lending feasible. From (A7) it follows that in equilibrium
(A7') 4[I'aXs f(I-r)J{F] f(1-q)[(1-r)aX,: f rXF] - 9(1-d)r(aXg XF) f XF
The left-hand side of (A7') also appears in assumption (4). Replace this by the right hand
expression of (A7') to see that assumption (4) is equivalent to
q(1-d')r(aXsXF) f XF f fSW c I. Since W z MR, if this holds then we also have
(4') 9(l-d')r(aXsXF) f XF f BMR C I
I-xF-[~Á1R
Clearly, (4') holds only if d'~1- . Thus, a necessary condition for lending Qr(~xs-xF)
to be feasible for the bank is that (4') is not satisfied, or equivalently that the complement
of (4') is satisfied. More general, given a value C in [0, MR], lending is feasible for the
bank if and only if the following inequality is satisfied:
(A14') q(1-d')I'(aX5XF) f XF -i- 6C ~ I.
Restating (Al4') in terms of C and adding the condition C z 0, we obtain condition
(A14). !f condition (A14) is satisfied, then by C ~ MR the complement of (4') holds, so
condition (A14) implies d' c 1 by (1) and (2).
The condition t' ~ 0 requires C~
R'-Xf I-Xp-qr(1-d')(XS-XF}p)
. It can be
r(XS-xFtP) - ~'4(1-d')(1-~)
seen easily that this always holds if C~ C', so condition (A14) also implies t' ~ 0.
Note that d' 1 0 by 0 c q,a,r C 1, XF ~ 0 and (2); and that f c 1 by (1) and XS ~
R~ 1~ X,:. Therefore condition (A14) implies 0 ~ d' C 1 and 0 c fc 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Proposition 5 states the solution to the optimization problem in
lemma 4. [n the lemma's 2 and 3, the critical values I'o and r' are defined. The other two
critical values for r that appear in the proposition, defined in (All) and (A12), are such
that (see A 13) ~~~0 iff r~Í'~ ; and ~~~MR ijf r~t' . The latter condition proves part (a)26
of the proposition in the following way: Given R- R', d- d' and f- f, conditions
(A l0) and (A 14) are both satisfied only if I`~r . Therefore, I'~C is necessary for the
existence of a feasible contract. In the rest of the proof this inequality is assumed to hold.
(b) Note that if r c r" (B c 0), the firm's individual rationality constraint B- A.C z 0
is not satisfied unless r c r' (A c 0). If r c Min[r',I'"j, B- A.C z 0 iff C 2 BIA.
Since A C 0, welfare is maximized if C is maximized subject to C 5 W, so C- W. In
order for the wealth constraint and the bormwer's individual rationality constraint to be
satisfied at the same time we must have W~ BIA, so W"sufficiently large""
The conditions 0 c f c 1 and 0 c d' c 1 were shown to hold in lemma 4.
(c) If r 1 ro (B ~ 0), then if r C r' (A c 0) two remarks can be made. Firstly, the
borrower's individual rationality constraint will not be binding for any C z 0, and
secondly, welfare is maximized by maximizing C. The wealth constraint implies C' - W.
This proves (c.i). (c.ii) Note that if r~ r', C will be minimized, so constraint (A14) of
the optimization problem in Lemma 4 will be binding. ,Now
if rcÍ`~, C~~O so C'-C~ .(c.iii) If I'~Í'~, GrcO so C'-0. . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6~ Proposition 5 states that for Max[r,I",I'7crcÍ`i , C' -~~ ,
which is strictly decreasing in q, as follows from substituting d" into (A13).
If Max~,r~crcr' , C' - W, which is non-increasing in q. So in the range
Max~,In]crcr we have C'(q) ? C'(q') for all 0 c q ~ q' c 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7- (a) Using propositions 1 and 5, we consider all cases where
lending is feasible in case of commitment and in case of renegotiation. It is shown that in
each case we have C s C'. First consider r G r'. By proposition 1, C''cR' . By
propositions 1 and 5, if lending is feasible in both cases of precommitment and
renegotiation and if r c r', then C' - W ~ C~ . Next consider r~ r'. Note thatgiven feasibility in the renegotiation case, r~ r' implies r 1 r', because if r~ r'
there is no r c I'o such that a feasible contract exists (see prop. 5). If r~ Max[r', r~],
lending is feasible in case of precommitment and in case of renegotiation
iff I'~Max[C,r7-Max[r~,rM,CJ . Given that this holds, consider the following situations:
(1) r~Min[Í',Í'i] . Then C'~C' by ~~~~ . (2) P~r~Í'i . Now ~-0; C'~0 .
(3) Í'~~r~Í' . It can be checked easily that Í'a~Í'i . Therefore in this case we necessarily
have Í'-ry . However, if r c rM then lending is not feasible in the precommitment
case. The condition I'~Max[C,L~j-Max[~A,I'M„r] is not satisfied. (4) I'~Max[Í',i'i] .
Now C-C'-0 . This concludes the proof of (a). (b.i) is proven if we show that for P
not too large we have t~L~ . For P not too large we have rM cP (note that rM c 0 if P
- 0 by (A4), (2) and (3)), so r-r by (AS). Compare ~ and (All). As for small P we
will not have MR ~~ M, the inequality holds. This proves (b.i). Next we prove (b.2).
Since r ~ r', (b.2) holds only if r- rM ~ r. rM is increasing in P, while I" is
independent of P if MK - W. Then for P large enough we have LtiL~ , so lending may
be infeasible with precommitment, while it is feasible without precommitment. Q.E.D.28
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Footnotes
1. See e.g. Barro (1976) and Benjamin (1978), where in the absence of bankruptcy a
relatively high amount of collateral is needed, because the borrower repays only if the
value of the collateral exceeds his debt.
2. In our setting the debtor will have received loans from only one creditor, so that
situations of conflicts among creditors are not considered. In practice the regulation of
such conflicts is an important concern of bankruptcy law, to prevent a costly race by
individual creditors to be first to sue the firm for repayment of their own claims.
3. In this respect, our approach is related to Hermalin and Katz (1991).
4. Note that in our setting bankruptcy is not an instrument to eliminate firms that are
economically inefficient, unlike a common presumption regarding bankruptcy (see White
(1989)), as the firm can operate in an economically efficient way.
5. Unlike e.g. Nalebuff and Scharfstein (1987), we do not study possible economic
tradeoffs between the accuracy of the test and its cost.
6. The only difference with debt renegotiation (voluntary debt forgiveness by the bank) is
that in case of reorganization the court decides that part of the debt is forgiven. All
payoffs are the same in both cases. -
7. The latter assumption is needed to rule out the situation described by Yanelle (1989).
She shows that if banks would compe[e for loans as well as deposits, high deposit rates
would push up interest rates to be paid by borrowers, which would benefit depositors but
hurt final borrowers. If direct finance would be available (i.e. without banks
intermediating between supplyers and demanders of funds), i[ might then happen that only
equilibria without banks as intermediaries exist (see also Stahl (1988)).
8. Comparing the entrepreneur's expected payoff in case of renegotiation with the payoff
if filed for bankruptcy, it is clear that an offer of debt renegotiation will be accepted by
both the successful and [he unsuccessful entrepreneur.
9. The entrepreneur's expected profit is equal to
U(R,C,r,P,d,f) - q{ d[f(XSXFC)t(1-f){r(-P-C)f(1-r)(XS XFC)}] f(1-d)(XS - R)}
f(1-q){ f(-C) f(1-F)[(1-r)(-P-C) f r(-C)] }
The bank's expected profit equals
V(R,C,r,P,d,f) - q(1-d)R t qd{ f[XFf6C] f(1-f)[r(aXSfBC) f(i-r)(XFtBC)) }
t(1-q){ f(XFtnc] f(I-t~[(1-r)(~xFftic) f r(xFt13C)] }- I31
10. This tradeoff occurs because both collateral and punishment reduce the entrepreneur's
expected utility: If P is high, then the maximum amount of collateral for which borrowing
still is profitable to the entrepreneur will be relatively low, and vice versa.
l l. I' is decreasing in W if I'M c~(see Appendix 1).
12. By using the word "also" we anticipate a result of the next section on renegotiation.
13. See Van den Brink (1981) and references in Berger and Udell (1990).
14. Given that default is reported, if the bank is not precommitted to file the borrower for
bankruptcy it will only do so if its ezpected revenue from liquidation is higher than the
revenue from debt forgiveness: a[G(d).I'XS f(1-G(d)).(1-I')XF] 1 XF. It can be easily
verified from the proof of proposition 4(expression A7) that d' is such that this condition
is satisfied in equilibrium. If it would not hold, then the bank would not file any bormwec
for bankruptcy. This would induce succesful borrowers to report pmject failure in any
case (d-1), and lending would be infeasible for the bank by assumption (4).
15. Note that I`o may well be below 'f~, making case (b) unattainable.
16. By (A8), U(R',C,I',P,d',f) - q(XSR') -(1-q)(Cf(1-f)(1-P)P].
17. If A ~ 0, B c 0 and W ~ BIA, the condition on C should be as follows: BIA s
C 5 W(Ma - W in this case). Welfare is maximized for A c 0 by maximizing C
(lemma 1), so only the upper bound C 5 MR is relevant here.
18. Since W G I- X,: by assumption ( 1), a necessary condition for W~ BIA to be
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